Sochi Olympic Terror: Connect the Dots

If you're interested in this exercise, get out a map of the Russian Federation. Draw a line between Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, and Sochi, soon to host the Olympics: total distance about 300 miles. You probably remember some of the more violent images of recent Grozny history: warfare, death, mayhem, suffering, and indiscriminate destruction. And all the consequent ills. Now take another look at your map.  Almost directly on that line you drew, about 200 miles from Sochi, is the small city of Nalchik.  It's a good bet you do not remember the tragic events that took place there.  But you should.  And so should Olympic security officials.

Shortly after 9 on the morning of 13 October 2005 bloody hell broke loose in Nalchik. Though, to this day, the causes, motives, and even outcomes are not totally clear: what is indisputable is that an armed force attacked federal, republican, and municipal law enforcement authorities located in the city. The attacking force numbered approximately 200 and was split into 10 groups, each with its own targets.  Some of the 200 attackers were apparently from the republic and some even local residents. At least 14 civilians were killed and 115 wounded.  There were thirty five deaths among the forces fighting for the city and something like 89 among the armed attackers.

Tactics like these have been used elsewhere. In Mumbai, India, on 29 November 2008, 12 coordinated shooting and bombing attacks started and stretched over the next three days. Reports suggest that 166 people were killed in the event and more than 300 wounded. In Nairobi Kenya, on 21 September 2013, a team of armed gunmen attacked the Westgate shopping mall. Reports on the outcome disagree, but there is no doubt there were many killed and wounded. The gunmen escaped.

Given what we know about the past and what we suspect about current motives, is it possible that Volgograd was just a feint? Might small teams be preparing even now for another attack?  How would you connect the dots?

Security at the Sochi Olympics: Let's Look at a Map

I am not a security expert.  This post outlines only some of the logical concerns that would confront someone pondering the situation for the first time.

Sochi's 410,000 residents perch on the shore of the Black Sea at the foot of the Caucasus Mountains. Could terrorists move weapons or people along water routes on the Black Sea coast?  Georgia and its troublesome area of Abkhazia, not long ago involved in armed conflict with Russia, are a mere 20 miles away.  One assumes that Russian naval forces have these matters safely in hand on their own coast, and that Georgian authorities are cooperating to eliminate any potential threat on their end. (See this for New York Times on US Navy in region for Games.)

Motor transport routes to Sochi are limited.  The only available "highway" from the outside world is the two-lane M27 / E97, which runs between the coast and the mountains from the Georgian border to Novorosiisk, approximately 150 miles as the gull flies. Restrictions on traffic and cargo at the border with Georgia aside, the task at first glance seems relatively straightforward: a single two-lane road. However, much of the route is isolated and given the many twists and turns, traffic must move slowly.  The road's many river crossings also present possible complications. (Traffic in Sochi itself will be locked down for the duration of the games, with only official vehicles allowed.)

Rail connections to Sochi from central Russia (eventually, Moscow) hug the Black Sea coast. The main railroad terminal is right in the heart of the city.  Like the highway, the railroad continues down the coast to Georgia.  This is a much simpler situation than a typical Russian city, which would have rail connections from all points of the compass.

Air connections to Sochi appear to be through Sochi International Airport on the bank of the Mzymta River in the town of Adler, approximately 15 miles southeast of Sochi's center. There are two runways: from the south the approach is over the Black Sea and, briefly, the town: from the north, the approach comes from the Caucusus and concludes over isolated wooded ridges. Given the importance of air travel to the success of the games, one assumes the Russian armed forces have all of the approaches sewed up. (Note that travel to Sochi proper will have to be along the M27 / E97 highway.)

All things considered, a quick look at a map might suggest (limited) optimism.  The principal physical aspects of the situation are well defined and limited in number, so, from this angle, things look good: Sochi is small, carefully watched, and defended by competent professionals.  Let's call this framework "Sochi ain't Athens." But there's a competing framework to consider, "Russia ain't Greece." Consider the isolated nature of most of the transportation infrastructure and the difficult, mountainous terrain. Why attack in Sochi when so many other spots are easier? (Hence, Volgograd.)  And terrorists have had years to plot out strategy and timing, train, cache supplies, etc.  My (admittedly amateur) sense is that the real battle is being fought by boots on the ground in places we'll never hear about.   

Putin's Pinata

Like a blindfolded kid revved on sugar wildly swinging a wiffle bat at a birthday pinata, Vladimir Putin's recent announcements give the impression of a man who badly wants something he can't comprehend.  But he's much more likely to swing himself out than hit the target; and, the other kids at the party want him to fail.

More than anything Putin wants respect. With the world's eyes about to turn to Sochi, it's time to move. Hence, he's writing checks on Russia's dime: $15 billion for Ukraine, plus gas subsidies. He's cashing in some political capital he neatly coined for himself: Khodorkhovsky heading home after 10 years in prison. How many more swings can he take at the pinata (Greenpeace, Pussy Riot,...)? If you want something from him, there will never be a better time to ask.

Many say that these moves are from strength.  (See NYT Khodorkhovsky)   Unfortunately, the media's eternal obsession with the soap opera of personal politics blinds them to the overall weakness of a system based on repression.  They misinterpret Putin's actions.  What if Putin's moves are from weakness? They can be seen as the desperate acts of a man who wants something he can't have: respect.  The action implications for US policy are totally different under the two scenarios.

Russian Nationalism and Nationalism in Russia

President Vladimir Putin shared a few thoughts yesterday with Russia's Federal Assembly regarding the country's oft problematic inter-ethnic relations.  Unless I'm missing the mark -- and I have been away for quite some time -- I find it interesting that Putin brought up the topic of  "Russian nationalists."  The apostrophes are Putin's, who in general labels those who claim to be nationalists as part of an "amoral internationale" of opportunists "deprived of culture" and "respect for traditions."  He sees an unholy trinity of "insolent immigrants from certain southern Russian regions," corrupt police who provide protection for cash, and "so-called" (my apostrophes) Russian nationalists at the foundation of the problem.  This formulation conveniently removes the links between the parts and the wholes.  Those "insolent immigrants" and "so-called" nationalists are part -- however unsavory, however unwanted -- of larger ethnic groups, both in the "near abroad" and inside the Russian core, with real issues and problems.  By cutting the link and denying reality, Putin is that much farther from improving an impossible situation.

Military Budget and Defense Highlights of Putin's 12 December Speech

Putin closed his traditional, long-winded speech to the Federal Assembly today with some remarks on the military. In addition to some of the usual boilerplate he mentioned the following items: 

1. We still have much to do in the development of modern, highly accurate combat systems. (Нам ещё многое нужно сделать по развитию современных высокоточных боевых комплексов.) You gotta imagine how badly their generals are drooling to get real Russian video of an explosive surprise party zooming down a chimney in one of those "insolent" southern regions.  Given the increasingly inexpensive technology, it remains an open question if an "insolent" area might not be first to the screen with a party clip. Of course, the violence and death are tragic, and the usefulness of "accuracy" is in question for even the best American weapons systems.

2. This year, according to plan, the number of enlisted men and contract sergeants grew to 220 thousand. With this in mind, we must think about how to create a trained and ready reserve. (В текущем году в соответствии с планами до 220 тысяч человек возросло число рядовых и сержантов-контрактников. При этом мы должны думать, как создать подготовленный мобилизационный резерв.)  Growth!... Growth!!! "We are healthy, we are strong..."   This just begs for a bit o' comparative analysis, which I unfortunately don't have the time for right now.  If that number is the total (and reading it six different ways suggests it is), the army truly has downsized (and is hopefully progressing in various areas of professionalization).  Interestingly, Putin broke out a number for enlisted personnel and contract sergeants.  Does the absence of a number for the officer corp tell us anything?  With an officer-to-fighter ration way out of synch with NATO, is this a swipe at a bloated and over-privileged group of (overwhelmingly) men largely living in the past?  BTW, later in the speech Putin thumps his chest a bit about finally solving the housing problem for the armed forces.  Perhaps this is more the result of reduced force size rather than new construction?

3. The money that we are dedicating to re-arming the army and navy, and on the modernization of the defense industrial complex, is, as you know, unprecedented. In all, the sum is 23 trillion, 23 trillion rubles. (Средства, которые мы выделяем на перевооружение армии и флота, на модернизацию оборонно-промышленного комплекса, как вы знаете, беспрецедентны. Они достигают цифры 23 триллиона вместе, 23 триллиона рублей.) Again, begs for some real comparative analysis.  What's a ruble worth?  What's a ruble worth ten years from now?  I suspect the Chinese spend more on condiments for their enlisted men.

4. We should be thinking even now, how the enterprises of our defense industrial complex will be utilized after state defense orders have been filled, after 2020. Enterprises cannot be allowed to become over-sized and unneeded. We need to strengthen our position on the world market. I ask the military-industrial commission to make proposals in this regard, so our enterprises can switch in a timely manner to the production of civilian goods in demand here and on the external market. (Уже сейчас мы должны думать, как будут загружены предприятия ОПК после выполнения гособоронзаказа, после 2020 года. Нельзя допустить, чтобы эти предприятия оказались переразмеренными и невостребованными. Нужно укреплять наши позиции на мировом рынке. И прошу Военно-промышленную комиссию представить предложения на этот счёт, чтобы наши предприятия могли своевременно переключиться на выпуск востребованной на нашем и на внешнем рынке продукции гражданского назначения.)  Switch in a timely manner?  Offering such idiocy in public reinforces my impression of Putin as a man truly out of touch with reality.

A Crock and a Hard Place: Spurious Choices and the IMF

Ukraininan parents forced to choose between warmth and food for their kids? The IMF would have us believe that profligate Ukrainians should pay more of their "fair" share to fight off the brutal, eastern winter cold. If this means pulling their belts another notch or three tighter, so be it. This is international politics as usual at the expense of the defenseless and voiceless. In an era of recession across most of the world, when deficit spending should be recognized as a useful tool of pubic policy, it is, instead, neutered by self-serving politicians. Great good could be done through guarantees alone, not even cash, yet they stoop to count nickles and dimes. Leaders everywhere build their careers on spurious choices: heat or food, Russia or the West; Rome or Moscow. The choice should never be food or heat: the self-evident answer is that they must have both. The answer can only be Russia and the West: a geographic fact (complicated by 70 years of shared infrastructure) that just won't go away. Both Rome and Moscow, Catholicism and Orthodoxy, have parts to play: a metaphysical question in the end, but one with potentially bloody consequences in the real world. Where are the insistent public cries for peace from religious "leaders"? Francis? Ukrainians of all nationalities are certainly far from blameless in this mess. Nonetheless, spurious choices continue to lure Ukrainian boys, and many are truly boys, to join the anonymous rows of club-toting police. Spurious choices lead their opponents, boys too, and girls, from the same streets, schools, and families to pick up rebar and chunks of concrete on their way to the stand-off. Let's hope they all just walk away. Choose peace with their feet.